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I. INTRODUCTION
The best piece of advice I received when I began teaching law was to
adopt Charlie Sullivan’s and Mike Zimmer’s casebook for my Employment
Discrimination class. Before I became a law professor, I had no clue how
important choosing the right textbook is, not only for the students but for
the teacher. I also was unaware of how much I had to learn about a subject
I thought I knew well. I had been litigating employment discrimination
cases for several years, but when I began teaching, I quickly learned how
much I did not know. Charlie’s and Mike’s casebook, through its
organizational structure, its case selection and, importantly, its thoughtful
and probing notes, gave me a deeper understanding of my field. As did
their scholarship.2
I first met Charlie at the AALS annual meeting my first year in law
teaching. I got up the nerve to introduce myself (I was, and still am, a bit
star-struck by Charlie), and was gratefully surprised by how kind and
approachable he was. He talked with me about my work in progress and
made me feel like I belonged in this profession. Later at the conference, he
introduced me to Mike, and the three of us ended up sharing a taxi to the
airport. Best cab ride ever.
From the day I met him, Charlie has encouraged, supported, and
inspired me. I have learned more about employment discrimination from
Charlie Sullivan than from anyone else I have known, and he has
influenced and shaped the way I (and my students) think about our area of
the law.
Later in my career, one of my proudest moments as a law professor
was when Charlie called to invite me to join him and Mike as their coauthor on the casebook. I am honored to participate in this symposium
celebrating Charlie; he has impacted my professional life in a way few
others have. I am grateful to be his colleague and his friend.
II. THE TALE OF CHRISTINE CRAFT, OR “TOO OLD, TOO UGLY AND NOT
DEFERENTIAL TO MEN”3
An example of Charlie’s and Mike’s careful case selection was
featuring, in early editions of the casebook, Craft v. Metromedia, Inc,.4 Set
in the world of local television news, the Craft case involved a sex
discrimination claim by Christine Craft, who had been demoted from her
job as co-anchor to reporter based largely on her on-air appearance.

2 That Charlie continues to produce some of the most insightful and path breaking
scholarship in our field inspires awe.
3 CHRISTINE CRAFT, TOO OLD, TOO UGLY AND NOT DEFERENTIAL TO MEN (1991).
4 Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985).
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Reaction by focus groups to Craft’s appearance was “overwhelmingly
negative,”5 and in response, the station, KMBC, instituted a “clothing
calendar” for Craft that dictated what clothes she would wear and provided
her with make-up tutorials.6 A follow-up telephone survey of randomly
selected viewers, pursuing issues raised by the focus groups, asked
participants to rank Craft against her female co-anchor competitors; almost
thirty percent of the questions dealt with “‘good looks’ or the dress of and
image of a ‘professional anchor woman.’”7 Craft did not fare well in
comparison. Indeed, the results were described as “devastating,” and when
the survey results came in, Craft was demoted.8 According to Craft, the
news director told her she was being reassigned “because the audience
perceived her as too old, too unattractive, and not deferential enough to
men.”9
Craft’s sex discrimination claim did not contend that appearance was
irrelevant to the job of being a television news anchor. Rather, her
contention was that appearance standards were more strictly applied to
female, as opposed to male, on-air talent. The district court rejected that
contention, finding that KMBC was concerned with the appearance of all
its on-air personnel, male and female, and had addressed individuals’
deficiencies as needed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed this finding.10 Craft
further argued, however, that “even if KMBC was evenhanded in applying
its appearance standards, the district court erred in failing to recognize that
the standards themselves were discriminatory,”11 contending “she was
forced to conform to a stereotypical image of how a woman anchor should
appear.”12 And she claimed that KMBC had relied on customer preference
to justify its discrimination against her. The Eighth Circuit rejected these
arguments as well. An emphasis on feminine “‘softness’ and bows and
5

Id. at 1209 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 1208–09.
7 Id. at 1209.
8 Id. The news director “characterized the results of the research, in the language of
the district court, as ‘devastating and unprecedented in the history of the consultants of
Media Associates.’” Id. (internal citation omitted). Craft was reassigned to a position as a
reporter at no loss of pay, a reassignment she refused. Id. Craft returned to her previous
news station in California to work as a co-anchor. Id. Craft subsequently became a lawyer
and also wrote a book about her experience. See CRAFT, supra note 3.
9 Craft, 766 F.2d at 1209. The news director “specifically denie[d] making such a
statement, and the district court believed his version of the conversation.” Id. (internal
citation omitted). Upholding this finding of fact, the Eighth Circuit stated, “The district
court was in the best position to determine whether to believe Shannon [the news director]
or Craft, and there are no circumstances suggesting any basis for finding clear error in the
district court’s choice in favor of Shannon.” Id. at 1212.
10 Id. at 1213–14.
11 Id. at 1214.
12 Id.
6
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ruffles” were but incidental to the station’s legitimate interests, particularly
given that “reasonable appearance requirements were ‘obviously critical’ to
KMBC’s economic well-being.”13 Nor, said the appeals court, was the fact
that Craft was meant to add “warmth and ‘comfortability’ to the newscast a
reflection that the station was placing her in a stereotypical ‘female’ role
secondary to her male co-anchor.”14 As for Craft’s allegation that she was
specifically told she was being demoted because she was viewed by the
audience as “too old, too ugly and not deferential enough to men[,]” the
news director denied making the statement, and the district court resolved
the credibility conflict in his favor.15
The Craft case raised a number of interesting issues. What should we
make, if anything, of the fact that Craft had been hired to “soften” the
newscast? If femininity got her the job, should that preclude her objecting
to being required to project a stereotypical feminine image? Moreover, if
the station were simply responding to viewer preferences and ratings,
should it matter to the outcome of the case whether those preferences or
ratings themselves were grounded in gender bias?16 Furthermore, could
appearance be a BFOQ for a job such as television news anchor?17 Why
didn’t the station mount a BFOQ defense, given that it certainly seemed to
have relied on stereotypes of female appearance and demeanor? Had this
case been brought after Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,18 with its recognition
that sex stereotyping can support a claim of sex discrimination, would the
outcome have been different? How far does or should the grooming code
exception to Title VII’s disparate treatment theory extend?19 All of these,
and more, were questions the Craft case allowed students to explore.
Eventually, Craft was dropped as a main case. Newer cases presented
newer issues involving sex stereotyping, grooming codes, customer
preference, and the BFOQ defense. Perhaps, too, there was a feeling
(maybe we should call it wishful thinking) that Craft was a relic from the
past, and that employers in television news were now more enlightened, as
were their viewers, and that a case such as Craft’s would not arise today.
Would it were so.

13

Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1216.
15 Craft, 766 F.2d at 1212.
16 See infra notes 122–39 and accompanying text.
17 A BFOQ is a bona fide occupational qualification that serves as an affirmative
defense to an intentional discrimination claim under Title VII and the ADEA. For a
discussion of the BFOQ defense, see infra notes 109–21 and accompanying text.
18 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
19 See infra notes 96–108 and accompanying text for a discussion of grooming codes
and appearance standards.
14
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III. THE MORE THINGS CHANGE . . . “ALL YOU NEED TO DO IS TURN ON
THE LOCAL NEWS. IT OFTEN LOOKS LIKE TAKE YOUR DAUGHTER TO WORK
DAY”20
The past year or so has seen a spate of well-publicized claims by
television news anchors from around the country. The claims have been
brought by women who are claiming their age, combined with their sex, led
to their dismissals or demotions from their jobs in television news.21 There
is the case of Nashville news anchor Demetria Kalodinos, fired from her
job at age fifty-eight, after thirty-three years on the air.22 Her replacement
was a thirty-two-year-old female.23 And news anchor Karen Fuller, fired at
forty-seven, claimed her station, KCTV, had “an ‘age ceiling’ for its female
anchors but not for its male anchors.”24 When discussing Fuller’s younger
replacement, the station manager was alleged to have remarked, “She can
20 Clair Suddath, Beloved Nashville Anchor Sues Meredith for Age Discrimination,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2018, 11:09 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-1
2-10/beloved-nashville-anchor-sues-meredith-for-age-discrimination
(quoting
Karen
Fuller’s attorney, Pete Smith). See also Dan Margolies, Former KCTV-5 Anchor’s Age
Discrimination Lawsuit Can Proceed, Judge Rules, KCUR (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.kc
ur.org/post/former-kctv-5-anchor-s-age-discrimination-lawsuit-can-proceed-judge-rules#stre
am/0 (quoting attorney for plaintiff Karen Fuller, who sued her employer, KCTV for age
and sex discrimination). Fuller’s suit settled on undisclosed terms one month before trial
was slated to begin. See Dan Margolies, Former KCTV Anchor Karen Fuller Settles Her
Discrimination Lawsuit Against Meredith Corp., KCUR (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.kcur.
org/post/former-kctv-anchor-karen-fuller-settles-her-discrimination-lawsuit-against-meredi
th-corp#stream/0.
21 The irony of my writing about this topic does not escape me. My first job out of
college was as a television news reporter. After about one and a half years on the job, I was
let go; the explanation given me by the news director was that I looked “too young” on
camera to be taken seriously by viewers. I always believed, however, that my dismissal had
more to do with my refusal to sleep with the news director. Sexual harassment in the
television news industry is something else that does not seem to have gone away, as the
allegations involving Roger Ailes, Matt Laurer, and Les Moonves, for example, make clear,
but discussion of sexual harassment claims in the television news industry is beyond the
scope of this article.
22 As Ms. Kalodinos stated in an interview with the New York Times,
My gender and my age stamped me with a bull’s-eye I couldn’t shed despite decades of
dedication, journalism awards, public respect and popularity. . . . At Meredith [the station’s
owner], the message to women journalists is loud and clear: Don’t make trouble, don’t stick
up for other women, and whatever you do, don’t get old.
Steve Cavendish, The Fight to Be a Middle-Aged Female News Anchor, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/opinion/meredith-kalodimos-age-discrimin
ation.html.
23 Suddath, supra note 20.
24 Margolies, Former KCTV-5 Anchor’s Age Discrimination Lawsuit Can Proceed,
Judge Rules, supra note 20. “Ms. Fuller’s suit alleged that removing older women from
highly visible roles has been a problem at Meredith stations, with a set of seven female
anchors in markets including Atlanta, Phoenix and St. Louis removed in a span of five years
and replaced with younger women.” Cavendish, supra note 22.
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be cute and young but also able to dress up and be more serious and
respectable . . . . How will she age, I wonder?”25 Michele Gillen, former
anchor and chief investigative reporter for CBS’s Miami affiliate last year
sued for age and gender discrimination after she was removed as host from
her public affairs program.26 Moreover, five female anchors recently sued
NY1, claiming that after Charter Communications took over, it “blatantly
marginalized them and cast them aside in favor of younger women and
men.”27 “We are fighting for any woman who has reached a certain age
and has been intentionally marginalized, passed-over and deemed less
relevant because of her age.”28 The situation in television news and
advertising is so pronounced that the Association of National Advertisers
has launched a #SeeHer initiative aimed at ensuring that the women we see
on air reflect women in our society at large.29
Discussions of these recent claims inevitably lead to a renewed
discussion in the media of the Craft case, which still remains the most
prominent case involving discrimination against a television news anchor.
Almost forty years after Craft was demoted, and thirty-five years after the
appellate court rejected her discrimination claim, it is striking how similar
the newsroom environment appears.30 Craft’s former lawyer, when asked
about the most recent claim involving a Kansas City television station,
noted the lack of progress that has been made in the years since Craft’s suit
was brought, observing that “[i]t is interesting that things seem not to
change much for females.”31 Prominent plaintiffs’ attorney Ed Buckley,
25 Margolies, Former KCTV-5 Anchor’s Age Discrimination Lawsuit Can Proceed,
Judge Rules, supra note 20.
26 See Johnny Diaz, Former CBS Miami Anchor Michele Gillen Files Age and Gender
Discrimination Suit, SOUTH FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.sunsentinel.com/news/florida/fl-ne-michelle-gillen-sues-wfor-age-discrimination-20180918story.html.
27 See Erik Larson, N.Y. News Anchors Sue Charter for Age, Gender Discrimination,
BLOOMBERG L. (June 19, 2019, 4:37 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/n-y-news-anchors-sue-charter-for-age-gender-discrimination.
28 Evans, supra note 1 (quoting open letter from plaintiffs to the public).
29 See Cavendish, supra note 22.
30

Aging in television newsrooms has always been a problem, particularly for women. For
every Judy Woodruff or Andrea Mitchell who has remained on the air into her 70s, many
more hit the ceiling that Ms. Fuller and Ms. Kalodimos have found, in spite of
performance. . . . Local television presents a particularly tough challenge: Ratings pressure
is ever-present, consultants are a constant and management turnover can be high—neither of
the general managers who terminated Ms. Fuller or Ms. Kalodimos, for instance, is still at
their station. And yet the cultural influence of these stations, for all that they’re viewed as
an outdated medium, remains real: Almost 40 percent of Americans watch local TV news,
more than watch cable or broadcast.
Id.
31 Margolies, Former KCTV-5 Anchor’s Age Discrimination Lawsuit Can Proceed,
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who has litigated numerous discrimination suits against television stations,
had a similar view: “I’ve been doing this work more than [thirty] years, and
I can’t tell you much has changed,” Buckley said, noting that TV stations
regularly fire based on age.32 He cited to what he termed as “coded
comments,” such as a need for “fresher talent” or a description of a young
female as someone who “pops.”33 “That means, boy, she’s young and sexy
and hot.”34
IV. SEX PLUS AGE OR AGE PLUS SEX? “IN OCCUPATIONS WHERE
APPEARANCE IS BELIEVED TO BE IMPORTANT, THE TREATMENT OF OLDER
WOMEN IS MUCH WORSE THAN THAT OF OLDER MEN OR YOUNGER
WOMEN.”35
That aging takes a harder toll on women in the workplace than on men
is a truth almost universally acknowledged.36 Moreover, women in
television news are hardly the only women to see their careers, or career
prospects, diminish with advancing years.37 But the treatment of these
women, who we welcome into our homes and watch each evening as they
age on air, is a particularly powerful example of how our society treats
older women.38 If these women, in prominent and prestigious positions,
Judge Rules, supra note 20.
32 Suddath, supra note 20.
33 Id.
34
Id.
35 Nicole B. Porter, Sex Plus Age Discrimination: Protecting Older Women Workers,
81 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 95 (2003).
36 Susan Bisom-Rapp & Malcom Sargeant, Its Complicated: Age, Gender and Lifetime
Discrimination Against Working Women—the United States and the U.K. as Examples, 22
ELDER L.J. 1, 21 (2014) (“Older women, however, suffer from the disadvantage of the
combination of stereotyping based on age and gender, both of which can negatively affect
them in the workplace.”); David Neumark, How Can We Know if There Is Discrimination in
Hiring?, ECONOFACT (Oct. 27, 2018), https://econofact.org/how-can-we-know-if-there-isdiscrimination-in-hiring (noting that experiential research shows that older women
experience more age discrimination than older men); Porter, supra note 35 (discussing how
appearance related norms affect women, particularly aging women, in the workplace and
while noting that age “has not truly affected the power or status of older men”). According
to Bisom-Rapp and Sargeant, research shows three predominant ways older women are
stereotyped—women are seen as aging earlier, their appearance is viewed more harshly than
older men’s and “compared to older men, aging women are seen as ‘less competent,
intelligent and wise.’” They are, however, seen as more nurturing, sensitive and warmer
than older men. See Bisom-Rapp & Sargeant, supra note 36, at 28.
37 Porter, supra note 35, at 95, 100–01 (noting that appearance matters outside
television news as “one survey found appearance to be the single most important factor in
employee selection for a wide variety of jobs” and that this is particularly true for women,
for whom “appearance and ‘the beauty myth’ really are a major cause of discrimination
against older women,” even in jobs where appearance could not be a primary function of the
job).
38 Cavendish, supra note 22 (“An unappreciated aspect of sexism in the workplace is
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can be cast aside when they grow older, what does that portend for the rest
of us?39 Or is there something about television news, a visual medium after
all, that gives employers in this field more room to take appearance into
account, even if doing so adversely impacts women?
Federal law prohibits discrimination in employment, and television
news anchors and reporters are unquestionably employees. Title VII
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex,40 and the ADEA prohibits
discrimination on the basis of age against workers age forty or above.41
Accordingly, firing or demoting women because of their sex or because of
their age (if forty or older) is unlawful, unless the employer can
successfully assert a BFOQ.42
But what happens when the claim is that it is not sex alone, nor age
alone, but the combination of sex plus age or age plus sex that has caused
the adverse action to occur?43 This contention was missing in the Craft
case. Despite the alleged references to her being “too old,” Craft did not
bring an age discrimination claim. Why not? Because she was only thirtyseven at the time of her demotion, and the ADEA’s protections apply only
to those age forty or above.44
How should the law treat claims such as these? Can a sex plus age
claim succeed under Title VII? Can an age plus sex claim succeed under
the ADEA? Or must these women sue separately under each statute,
creating the risk that each claim may fail based on the presence of the
alternative motivation under the other statute?

age discrimination, and it operates in many places. But one of the places where it’s most
visible—where we can all #SeeHer getting aged out—is in TV news.”).
39 Bisom-Rapp & Sargeant, supra note 36, at 28 (“Discussions of how aging affects
women typically reference the problem of appearance. In societies that prize female youth
and beauty, signs of aging in women lead to their devaluation and what has been termed
‘gender ageism.’”); see also Porter, supra note 35, at 107 (pointing to literature supporting
the fact “that it is far more common for older women to be the victims of appearance related
discrimination that for older men or younger women to fall victim to this phenomenon.”).
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2) (2018).
41 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2018).
42 See discussion infra notes 109-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
BFOQ affirmative defense.
43 Patti Buchman, Title VII Limits on Discrimination Against Television Anchorwomen
on the Basis of Age Related Appearance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 190, 191 (1985) (contending
that emphasizing youthful appearance for women to a greater degree than men runs afoul of
Title VII and asserting, “There is evidence that network executives and station managers
regard women over the age of forty as ‘too old’ and ‘too unattractive’ to anchor the news.
Whereas for male anchors ‘gray hair and frown lines are wrinkles and [considered] marks of
distinction, . . . [f]or women they’re the kiss of death.’”).
44 Should we consider it progress that today’s women anchors have been able to retain
their jobs into their forties and fifties, something that would have been virtually unheard of
at the time Craft brought her claim? Of course not.
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A. Title VII and Sex Plus Age Claims
Christine Craft brought a Title VII disparate treatment claim against
KMBC and its parent company, and disparate treatment claims are alleged
in the more recent claims being brought by female anchors as well.45
“Disparate treatment,” the Supreme Court tells us:
is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in
some cases be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment.46
The Court was discussing Title VII, but the disparate treatment theory
applies under the ADEA as well.
Disparate treatment, despite the Supreme Court’s description of it, has
proved neither simple nor easily understood. In fact, it is quite
complicated, as the cases discussed herein demonstrate. But the gist of the
disparate treatment theory is this: if the plaintiff proves the protected
characteristic actually motivated the decisionmaker, then she generally
prevails.47 Discriminatory intent or motive is not the equivalent of hatred,
ill will or animus. Intent is present when the employer takes the action
because of the plaintiff’s sex, for example, even if the action were taken for
ostensibly benign purposes.48 If a woman is intentionally treated
differently than she would have been treated were she a man, even if the
employer claims he has good business reasons for treating her differently, a
disparate treatment claim is present.49
Suppose, though, that it is not simply a woman’s sex, but her sex plus
some other characteristic, which has caused the employer to take action
against her. Can she successfully bring a claim?
In Phillips v. Martin Marietta,50 the employer refused to hire women

45 See, e.g., Torre, et al v. Charter Communications, Inc. d/b/a/Spectrum, Case 1:19-cv05708 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
46 Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
47 I say generally because there is an affirmative defense, known as the BFOQ,
discussed infra. Moreover, there is a judicially created exception for dress and grooming
codes, discussed infra at notes 96–108. Finally, there is the question of motivating factor
versus but for causation, also discussed infra at notes 66–68.
48 See, e.g., Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (sexspecific policy constituted disparate treatment, whether or not employer’s motive was
beneficent).
49 We will put aside for the moment the role customer preference may play in these
claims. This issue is discussed infra notes 122–39 and accompanying text.
50 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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with pre-school age children, while imposing no such limitation on the
hiring of men. The Court held that this “sex plus” discrimination ran afoul
of the statute.51 Even though not all women were subject to the hiring
ban,52 those with young children were being treated differently than men
with young children. This “sex plus” discrimination constituted disparate
treatment within the meaning of the statute.53
Courts have gone on to recognize other sex plus claims, almost always
when the “plus” involves an immutable characteristic or fundamental
right,54 and the courts also have recognized sex plus race claims under
Title VII.55 As one commentator recently asserted, “As courts have
developed the doctrine, the additional ‘plus’ factor in a sex-plus case must
pertain to either to an immutable characteristic or a fundamental right.”56
But, importantly, the claims have been recognized under Title VII, whether
the plus is school age children, marital status, race or religion. Recognizing
“sex plus” claims means that women can allege sex discrimination “even
when not all members of a disfavored class are discriminated against.”57
Or as Professor Marc McAllister correctly describes the sex plus theory,
“an employer in a sex-plus case cannot justify its discriminatory actions
towards a particular subgroup of women simply by pointing to its favorable
treatment of other women outside that particular subgroup.”58
But what if the sex plus claim under Title VII is sex plus age? Here,
the question becomes more difficult. One commentator, Professor Nicole
Porter, asserts that despite the protections of Title VII and the ADEA:
[A]n older woman cannot bring a claim based on the fact that she
51

Id.
Id. at 543 (noting that the majority of the employer’s workforce was female).
53 Id.
54 See, e.g., Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir.
2004) (alleged discrimination against women with young children); Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (no marriage rule for stewardesses violates
statute).
55 See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980);
Lam v. Univ. of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994); Marc Chase McAllister, Extending
the Sex-Plus Discrimination Doctrine to Age Discrimination Claims Involving Multiple
Discriminatory Motives, 60 B.C.L. REV. 469, 483 n.102 (collecting cases).
56 McAllister, supra note 55, at 477 (emphasis added); see also Buchman, supra note
43, at 198, 201 (questioning whether age-related appearance is immutable, like race, or
mutable, like weight, and contending that youthful appearance is either immutable or semiimmutable).
57 Back, 365 F.3d at 118.
58 McAllister, supra note 55, at 478; see also Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1240
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (“The point behind the establishment of the sex-plus discrimination theory
is to allow Title VII plaintiffs to survive summary judgment when the defendant employer
does not discriminate against all members of the sex. Thus, the . . . cases have not created a
new remedy, but instead have closed a loophole through which defendant employers could
escape Title VII liability.”).
52
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feels she was discriminated against because she is an older
woman. In other words, her claim must be brought either on the
basis of her sex or on the basis of her age, but not on the basis of
both her sex and age combined.59
As she states, using an example especially pertinent here, “[d]espite our
laws prohibiting age discrimination and sex discrimination, one only has to
look as far as the television in one’s home to see an example of how the
merging point of sexism and ageism has really affected older women in a
very unique, and unfortunately, very negative way.”60 As she observes,
protection under Title VII or the ADEA for older women as such has
proven elusive.
Professor McAllister also acknowledges the difficulties posed by such
claims under either Title VII or the ADEA, noting:
[S]ome courts have rejected attempts to claim subgroup
discrimination under Title VII by older male or female
employees, reasoning that because the ADEA does not permit a
combined age-plus-sex discrimination claim, plaintiffs should
not be allowed to recast such a claim as a sex plus age claim
under Title VII.61
He goes on to state, however, that some courts have recognized these
claims under Title VII,62 a result for which both he and other commentators
advocate.63
Given that other “sex plus” claims are widely recognized under Title
VII, why are sex plus age claims so problematic? The reasons are varied.
For one thing, unlike many of the sex plus cases brought under Title VII,
the plus involves neither another protected category under Title VII (such

59 Porter, supra note 35, at 79; see also Katlyn J. Lynch, Sex-Plus-Age Discrimination:
State Law Saves the Day for Older Women, 31 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 151 (2015)
(noting that no federal appellate court has adopted, and some have explicitly rejected, Title
VII sex plus age claims); Bisom-Rapp & Sargeant, supra note 36, at 31 (“[L]egal doctrine is
in general not hospitable to claims of intersectional discrimination . . . .”); Joanne Song
McLaughlin, Limited Legal Recourse for Older Women’s Intersectional Discrimination
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 26 ELDER L.J. 287, 315 (2019) (noting
that the ADEA and Title VII are ineffective in protecting older women from discrimination).
60 Porter, supra note 35, at 94.
61 McAllister, supra note 55, at 486.
62 It is fair to say, however, that very few cases have discussed the issue in any detail.
See Porter, supra note 35, at 87 n.68; McAllister, supra note 55, at 488. At least two
circuits did consider the question but did not decide whether such a claim was viable,
finding it unnecessary, under the facts presented, to do so. See Best v. Johnson, 714 F.
App’x 404 (5th Cir. 2018); Sherman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 188 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 1999).
63 See Sabina F. Crocette, Considering Hybrid Sex and Age Discrimination Claims by
Women: Examining Approaches to Pleading and Analysis—A Pragmatic Model, 28 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 115 (1998); Porter, supra note 35, at 102–11; Lynch, supra note 59, at 151;
Buchman, supra note 43, at 195.
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as race) nor a characteristic that correlates with gender stereotypes (such as
being a working mother with young children).64 More importantly, Title
VII and the ADEA are separate statutes and have different proof structures,
and this difference has led some courts to find that sex plus age claims are
not available under Title VII.65
Importantly, Title VII permits mixed motive claims.66 The ADEA,
according to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc.,67 does not. Title VII allows plaintiffs to prevail by showing
that sex was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision-making, even if
other factors also motivated the decision. The ADEA, however, requires
that age be the “but for” cause of the at-issue decision. Although it need
not be the sole factor, age must be the “but for” cause. Thus, allowing sex
plus age claims under Title VII, in the view of these courts,
would be tantamount to allowing plaintiff to argue age
discrimination in the context of a mixed-motive theory of
discrimination. Such a result stands in direct opposition to the
language of the ADEA and the Supreme Court’s holding in
Gross. In addition, it would provide plaintiffs an end-run around
the heightened standards set forth by Congress under the
ADEA.68
Or as the district court stated in Best v. Johnson, “[b]ecause Congress
chose to protect the two characteristics in completely separate statutory
schemes, allowing Best to pursue her ‘gender plus age’ claim at trial would
constitute improper judicial legislation. Courts have declined to recognize
such ‘plus’ claims on this basis alone.”69 Older women, said the Best court,
64 See Bauers-Toy v. Clarence Cent. Sch. Dist., 10-CV-845, 2015 WL 13574291
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015); see also McAllister, supra note 55, at 488–90 (discussing
Bauers-Toy).
65 See Best v. Johnson, 1:15-CV-00086-NBB, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147819 (N.D.
Miss. Aug. 30, 2018). See also McAllister, supra note 55, at 485–86; Lynch, supra note 59,
at 154. Similar issues may arise for sex plus claims involving other statutes, such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act. For a discussion of sex plus claims involving sex and
disability, see Jennifer Bennett Shinall, The Substantially Impaired Sex: Uncovering the
Gendered Nature of Disability Discrimination, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1099 (2017).
66 42 U.S.C. § 2002e-2(m) (2018); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989).
67 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
68 Bauers-Toy, 2015 WL 13574291, at *6; see also, McAllister, supra note 55, at 488–
90 (discussing Bauers-Toy).
69 Best v. Johnson, No. 1:15-CV-00086-NBB, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147819, at *4;
see also Bauers-Toy, 2015 WL 13574291, at *6 (“While the Court is cognizant of plaintiff’s
valid argument that an individual could be treated unlawfully as a result of both age and
gender, it is not within the Court’s purview to create a cause of action under Title VII which
does not apparently exist.”); Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, No. 17-cv01294-RM-NYW, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104796, at *8 (D. Colo. June 22, 2018) (rejecting
sex plus age claim: “[S]hould plaintiffs’ standalone age discrimination fail under a narrower
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are not a protected class for purposes of Title VII.70
A few district courts, however, have permitted such claims. One of, if
not the first to do so, was Arnett v. Aspin,71 a district court opinion. In
allowing the claim to proceed, the Arnett court relied upon the sex plus
theory recognized in Phillips v. Martin Marietta and its progeny.72
Regardless of the subclass, the court said, Title VII, as understood by the
sex plus theory, does not permit employers to discriminate against some
women so long as they do not discrimination against all women.73 In the
court’s view, that the sex plus claim involved protections provided by two
different statutes was a distinction without a difference. Arnett, however,
was decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross. Does or should
that matter?
Should sex plus age claims be recognized today under Title VII?
Both Professors Porter and McAllister argue that they should be. As
Professor Porter explains, it is insufficiently protective of older women to
relegate them to bringing separate claims under Title VII and the ADEA:
when an older woman is replaced by a younger woman, while older men
retain their jobs, she is unlikely to be successful under either the ADEA or
Title VII in cases involving circumstantial evidence of discrimination.74 As
she explains, her Title VII sex discrimination claim would likely fail
because she was replaced by a woman.75 Her age discrimination claim

scope of liability, plaintiffs would be able to [fall back] on their gender plus age claim under
a broader scope of liability. The Court will not allow such an attempt to work-around
statutory dictates.”).
70 Best, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147819, at *5.
71 846 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1994). According to Professor Porter, Arnett was the
only court, as of 2003, to have “actually discussed and decided the issue of whether the law
should recognize a sex plus age theory of discrimination. Other courts have given it only
cursory treatment.” Porter, supra note 35, at n.68.
72 Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1238–40.
73 Id. at 1240.
74 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), the Supreme Court
established the elements of a prima facie case for plaintiffs, which, once established, shifted
to defendant the burden of articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
challenged action. While circuits have interpreted the elements of the test differently, the
general requirements include: (1) the plaintiff was within the protected class; (2) the
plaintiff had met objective qualifications or other benchmarks in job performance; (3) the
plaintiff was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Some circuits have
required a particular showing of disparate treatment through comparators to meet the prima
facie burden. See, e.g., Johnson v. Ohio Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 942 F.3d 329, 331 (6th Cir.
2019); Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). McDonnell
Douglas was a Title VII case; the Supreme Court has never formally adopted this test in the
ADEA context. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 n.2. (2009).
75 Porter, supra note 35, at 105–06.
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would likely fail because older men were retained.76 “Even with the very
strong evidence that the older woman was being discriminated against
because she is an older woman, the plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA claims
would both fail if analyzed separately,” Professor Porter asserts, since in
each claim there would be no comparator outside the protected class treated
more favorably.77
Porter contends that a straightforward application of the sex plus
theory, as occurred in Arnett, should be applicable to sex plus age claims;
Using this rule . . . an older woman should be able to prove that,
had she been an older man, she would have been treated
differently, even if there were plenty of younger women who
were treated better than she was. Simply following precedent
leads us to the conclusion that the sex plus age theory should be
recognized.78
But Professor Porter’s article was written before the Supreme Court’s
decision in Gross. Professor McAllister’s, on the other hand, was written
in a post-Gross landscape, and he, too, concludes that sex plus age claims
should be recognized under Title VII.79 He does so after acknowledging
the conflict between Gross on the one hand and Phillips v. Martin Marietta
on the other.80 But the “most logical” way to resolve the conflict, he says,
is to focus simply on the Title VII claim, which permits sex plus claims,
without regard to whether an “age plus” claim may or may not be available
under the ADEA.81 And he agrees with Professor Porter that “the biases,

76 Professor Porter notes that in disparate treatment cases involving circumstantial
evidence, plaintiff must show, as part of her prima facie case, that comparable employees
not in the protected group were treated more favorably. Porter, supra note 35, at 105.
77 Id. See also Crocette, supra note 63, at 143 (claims under the separate statutes allow
employers to focus on younger women and older men to defeat claims at summary judgment
stage); Kate Sablosky Elengold, Clustered Bias, 96 N.C.L. REV. 457, 466–69 (2018)
(making a similar point for sex plus race claims). For a discussion of comparator proof in
discrimination cases, see Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving
Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191 (2009).
78 Porter, supra note 35, at 108.
79 McAllister, supra note 55, at 473.
80 McAllister, supra note 55, at 501 (“On the one hand, if age-plus-sex claims under the
ADEA are precluded by Gross’s conception of but-for causation—under which an ADEA
plaintiff must prove that was ‘the reason’ for the adverse employment action as opposed to
‘simply a motivating factor’—then sex-plus-age discrimination claims under Title VII also
should be precluded because permitting such claims would allow a plaintiff to prevail upon
a showing of two discriminatory motives, thereby circumventing the causation principles
espoused in Gross. On the other hand, if the Title VII sex-plus doctrine is applied faithfully,
then sex-plus-age claims should be permitted, given that the well-established sex-plus
doctrine, flowing from Phillips, permits such claims when an employer discriminates
against a subgroup of male or female employees on the basis of an immutable characteristic,
which would naturally encompass a person’s age.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
81 McAllister, supra note 55, at 501.
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prejudices and stereotypes associated with both ‘ageism’ and ‘sexism’
become worse when coupled together, becoming for some women a
‘double hurdle’ of sex discrimination and age bias.’”82 That the plus factor
involves an immutable characteristic protected by another statute is, in his
mind, as in the mind of the Arnett court, a distinction without a difference
as far as Title VII is concerned.83
This view appears correct. Discrimination against a subgroup of
women, because they are women, runs afoul of Title VII, even if other (or
even most) women are not victims of discrimination.84 Whether the claim
would succeed under the ADEA should have no bearing on its validity
under Title VII.85
Importantly, though, the courts have not widely embraced this view.
And their unwillingness to do so goes beyond whether a successful prima
facie case can be brought. Courts are refusing to permit a sex plus age
theory to proceed as outside the protections afforded by Title VII.86
B. The ADEA and Age Plus Sex Claims
If sex plus age claims are allowed under Title VII, does it follow that
age plus sex claims should be allowed under the ADEA? Not necessarily.
Even the district court judge who authored the Arnett opinion rejected an
age plus theory under the ADEA.87
Unlike under Title VII, where sex plus claims have been expressly
recognized by the Supreme Court, the Court has not squarely addressed an
age plus claim. Most courts rejecting “age plus” claims have done so in
reliance on Gross, finding that it would be inconsistent for a plaintiff to
82

McAllister, supra note 55, at 503 (citations omitted).
McAllister, supra note 55, at 502.
84 See Elengold, supra note 77, at 498–99 (advocating for a “cluster framework, rather
than a “sex plus” framework for intersectional claims). “Sex plus,” she claims, is confusing
and fundamentally flawed because intersectionality is “not an additive experience.” Id. at
498. Instead,
the cluster framework specifically defines sex discrimination to include the categorization,
stereotyping, and subjugation of particular subgroups of women . . . and treats
discrimination against a subset of women as ‘pure’ sex discrimination—no plus needed . . . .
If a subgroup of women is treated differently because they are women, that is sex
discrimination.
Id. at 499.
85 One commentator, who also agrees these claims should be recognized under Title
VII, relying on Phillips v. Martin Marietta and its progeny, points out that even if courts
reject such claims under Title VII, state law may provide protection, as a number of states
outlaw sex and age discrimination in the same statute. See Lynch, supra note 59. See also
McLaughlin, supra note 59, at 308–12.
86 See supra notes 69–70.
87 Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 907 F. Supp. 864, 875 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (refusing to recognize
a claim based on age plus disability).
83
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claim her age was the “but for”cause of the adverse action while also
claiming the action was based on her gender.88 However, a handful of
courts have allowed “age plus” claims to proceed, reasoning that if sex plus
claims are valid under Title VII, then “age plus” claims should be viable
under the ADEA.89 They also have recognized that the “but for” causation
standard adopted in Gross for the ADEA is not a sole cause standard. The
“but for” causation standard may be satisfied, even if other factors, such as
sex, were also implicated in the decision.90
Recall that at the time Phillips v. Martin Marietta was decided, “but
for” causation was the causal standard under Title VII, as well. That
causation standard did not preclude the Court from recognizing that
discrimination against only a subgroup of the protected class was
nonetheless discrimination within the meaning of the statute.91
Accordingly, Gross should not be seen as a barrier to an “age plus” claim,
including an “age plus sex” claim.
Whether a plaintiff may successfully bring a sex plus age claim under
Title VII or an age plus sex claim under the ADEA, however, is admittedly
unclear. The handful of courts that have addressed the issue have divided
on the viability of such claims. And bringing the claims separately, as a
sex discrimination claim under Title VII and/or as an age discrimination
claim under the ADEA, using a circumstantial evidence approach runs the
very real risk that the claims will fail. A woman who loses her job to
another woman or an older worker who is let go while other older workers
are retained may often find it difficult to establish a prima facie case under
either statute, regardless of the causation standard used.92

88

See Famighette v. Rose, 2:17-cv-2553 (DRH)(ARL), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74484,
at *14 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2018); see also McAlllister, supra note 55, at 493–97 (collecting
cases).
89 McAllister, supra note 55, at 497–99 (collecting cases). But see McLaughlin, supra
note 59, at 290 (“The ADEA has never recognized this intersectionality of discrimination.”).
90 Even the dissenters in Price Waterhouse understood that but for causation allowed
for other motivations to be present; it simply was plaintiffs’ burden to show that sex was the
but for cause of the challenged decision. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
282–84 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
91 See McAllister, supra note 55, at 505 (recognizing this point). He also points to the
fact that the ADEA is not a sole cause statute and further argues that while Gross rejected
mixed motives claims involving both lawful and unlawful motives, here both reasons are
unlawful, and but for causation principles do not preclude claims involving multiple illegal
motives. For these reasons, Professor McAllister contends age plus sex claims should be
permitted, but he also calls for an amendment to the ADEA adding motivating factor
language to clarify that age plus claims should be permitted when multiple illegal
motivations are present. Id. at 503–08.
92 See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
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V. APPEARANCE BASED EXCEPTIONS TO DISPARATE TREATMENT
THEORY; OR, “(S)HE’S GOT A GREAT FACE FOR RADIO”93
Leaving aside the difficulties, discussed above, inherent in bringing an
intersectional claim based on sex plus age, other potential obstacles loom
for older female anchors. Television, after all, is a visual medium, and the
question becomes whether the employer could justify its disparate
treatment of older women under either a grooming code, a BFOQ or a
customer preference exception.
Facially discriminatory policies, or direct evidence of discriminatory
motive, are the relatively easy disparate treatment claims. Direct evidence
consists of statements by the decision maker, made in reference to the
employment decision at issue, that facially demonstrate the prohibited
bias.94 Were a station manager, for example, to say it was firing its news
anchor because she was a woman, we would not be left to wonder about
why she was fired. We know why. If the trier of fact determines that the
statement was made and that it accurately reflected the decision maker’s
motivation, intentional discrimination is established. In the Craft case, for
example, had the trial court believed, as Craft claimed, that the station
manager had told Craft she was being demoted because she was “too old,
too unattractive and not deferential enough to men,” that would have been
direct evidence of discrimination, and the result in the case would
presumably have been different.95
When a facially discriminatory policy or other direct evidence of
discrimination is present and credited, the question then turns to whether
the employer has a valid defense. That is, unless the claim involves a dress
or grooming code, as in Craft.
A. Dress and Grooming Codes
One significant exception to disparate treatment theory, and one front
and center in the Christine Craft case, is the judicially-created exception for
dress and grooming codes. Different grooming codes or appearance
standards for men and women have routinely been upheld by the courts,
despite being facially discriminatory.96 An employer may permit women to
93 A remark my former news director was fond of making about other on-air talent in
the market.
94 For a discussion of what constitutes direct evidence, see CHARLES A. SULLIVAN AND
MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, 74, n.5
(Wolters Kluwer, 9th ed. 2017).
95 But see Best v. Johnson, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147819, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 30,
2018) (stating that older women are not a protected class under Title VII). Under that
reasoning, even direct evidence of discrimination would not suffice.
96 See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc).
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wear their hair long while requiring men to wear theirs short,97 and it may
insist that women wear makeup,98 or that men wear ties.99 So long as the
requirements are not deemed more onerous for one gender than for the
other, courts have viewed sex-differentiated grooming and appearances
standards as essentially too de minimis to violate the statute.100 As the
Ninth Circuit put it, “Grooming standards that appropriately differentiate
between the genders are not facially discriminatory.”101 That, of course, is
incorrect. These policies are facially discriminatory. But they nonetheless,
despite enormous critical commentary to the contrary,102 have been deemed
outside the reach of Title VII. Separate but equal is the currently accepted
touchstone vis a vis grooming and appearance codes.
Do dress and grooming codes play into and reinforce gender
stereotypes? Indeed they do. But to date that has not stopped courts from
permitting employers to enforce them. In Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating
Company, Inc., the court distinguished gender-specific grooming codes
from the sex stereotyping at work in Price Waterhouse.103 In Price
Waterhouse, the sex stereotyping created a catch-22 for Ann Hopkins—out
of a job if she conformed to sex stereotypes and out of a job if she did not.
No such catch-22 was present at the casino, said the Jespersen court.104
And it rejected the argument that Harrah’s requirement that female
bartenders wear makeup impermissibly perpetuated the stereotype that
women, but not men, must be sexually attractive.105 Adopting Jespersen’s
argument, the court essentially conceded, would wipe out most genderspecific dress and grooming codes, something the court was not prepared to
do.106
Recall that in the Craft case, the question was not whether the station
could insist that men and women dress differently. The question was

Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1087–88 (5th Cir. 1975).
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1113.
99 Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977).
100 Courts have rejected the argument that these grooming codes constitute
impermissible sex plus discrimination. See McAllister, supra note 55, at 485.
101 Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109–10.
102 See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Wilig, Another Hair Piece, Exploring New Strands of
Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079 (2010); Michael Selmi, The Many Faces of
Darlene Jespersen, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 467 (2007).
103 Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1111–13.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1109-11.
106 Currently pending before the Supreme Court is Bostock v. Clayton County, No. 171618, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 2927 (U.S., Apr. 22, 2019) and its companion cases, in which the
Court is considering whether discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and/or
transgender status is prohibited by Title VII. How the Court rules in those cases could well
impact the question of sex stereotyping and gender specific dress and grooming codes.
97
98
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whether the grooming standards for women were more onerous or were
being applied more rigorously to women than to men. Craft lost on this
question of fact, just as Darlene Jespersen did decades later.107 The more
recent cases being brought by older female anchors also do not take aim at
the existence of separate dress and grooming codes for women and men per
se. Rather, as in Craft, the claim is that stations hold women to higher and
more demanding appearance standards, standards that celebrate youth and
beauty in women, while permitting men to age with dignity on the air.108
An interesting twist in these recent cases is the insertion of age into
the equation. Well-groomed, professionally attired and, yes, attractive
women are being pushed aside, so the allegations go, in favor of younger,
more attractive women, while male counterparts suffer no such fate. Could
a station defend these claims by openly claiming that youth and beauty is
essential for its female, but not male, anchors?
B. BFOQs and Television News
The factual finding that appearance standards were not more
demanding or applied more harshly to Craft than to her male counterparts
is questionable at best.109 And when one watches television news today, it
is hard not to conclude that for women, being relatively young and
attractive remains the coin of the realm at the anchor desk (or even in the
field). If so, why do stations not simply assert a BFOQ? Why do they not
just admit that appearance matters and that, as the rankings show, it matters
more for women than for men? There are two reasons, one legal and one
practical. Legally, an appearance based BFOQ is essentially dead in the
water.110 Practically, no news director worth his salt would let his station
assert a BFOQ defense.111
107

See Emily Gold Waldman, The Preferred Preferences in Employment
Discrimination Law, 97 N.C. L. REV. 91, 105–06 (2018) (“[C]ourts have applied the equal
burdens test very loosely, allowing employers to defer to customer preferences that are in
reality more burdensome on females than males,” calling the Craft case “a blatant example
of this.”).
108 Joanne Bal, Proving Appearance-Related Sex Discrimination in Television News: A
Disparate Impact Theory, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 211, 211 (“Although both male and female
anchorpersons must meet substantial image requirements, anchorwomen are generally
forced to conform to a much narrower and more demanding ideal of youth and beauty.”).
See also Buchman, supra note 43, at 191. In other words, assuming it is permissible for
stations to insist on a youthful on-air appearance, they may not apply that standard
disparately to men and women. Id. at 199.
109 See Waldman, supra note 107, at 127–28 (“Both the Craft and Jespersen courts
explicitly minimized the differential burdens that the hair and makeup expectations had on
female employees, insisting that they were roughly equal to those imposed on male
employees, despite significant evidence to the contrary.”).
110 See infra notes 112–20 and accompanying text.
111 See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
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Both Title VII and the ADEA permit employers to facially
discriminate on the basis of sex or age when sex or age “is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise.”112 The BFOQ is an affirmative
defense to disparate treatment claims, and it has been construed very
narrowly by the courts. Two prongs must be met. First, the aspect of the
job for which sex or age is claimed to be necessary must go to the essence
of the employer’s business.113 To put it another way, what is the central
mission of the business, and does the employer need to discriminate in
employing people for the job in question in order to further that central
mission? It is not enough to show that an employer will make more money
if it discriminates or that its intentional discrimination is a product of its
customers’ preferences.
For example, a BFOQ claim asserted by Southwest Airlines that it
needed to hire only women as flight attendants because it had marketed
itself as a flying cocktail lounge, and that its customers, primarily men,
wanted attractive women serving them drinks in the air, was firmly
rejected.114 The essence of an airline’s business is the safe transportation of
passengers, not selling sexiness in the air.115 Thus, requiring that flight
attendants be women would not go to the essence of the airline’s
business.116 Nor could a battery-making plant insist that only infertile
women work in its manufacturing jobs.117 The essence of Johnson
Controls’ business was making batteries, and fertile women can make
batteries as well as fertile men, even if the battery-making process posed a
risk to a developing fetus. Thus, no BFOQ was present.
Second, even if the essence of the business test is satisfied, the
employer must show that either all or substantially all members of the
excluded group cannot perform the job or that it is impossible or
impractical to deal with the excluded group on an individual basis.118 For
example, the safe transportation of passengers is the essence of an airline’s
business, and thus it may insist that its pilots be healthy and not at risk of a
112

42 U.S. C. § 2000e-2(e); 29 U.S.C.§ 623(f)(1).
See Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1999).
114 Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. Tex. 1981). See also
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
115 “[S]ex does not become a BFOQ merely because an employer chooses to exploit
female sexuality as a marketing tool . . . .” Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 303.
116 The Southwest Airlines court distinguished airlines from strip clubs, where selling
sex is the essence of the business. Id. at 301–02. A strip club hiring topless waitresses
would be different from an airline and could insist on hiring women. But what about a
restaurant such as Hooters? Can it insist that those serving its chicken wings and beer be
sexy women?
117 Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991).
118 Western Airlines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414–16 (1985).
113
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heart attack or stroke. But it may not use age as a proxy for health; rather,
it can administer physicals to its pilots to determine who does or does not
present a risk to the airline’s passengers.
Understood in this way, it is easy to see how a BFOQ defense would
fail if asserted in the context of television news.119 Yes, television is a
visual medium, but the essence of the business is informing the public by
delivering the news. Men and women, young and old, can do that.
Insisting that female anchors be attractive younger women goes no more to
the essence of the news business than it did to Southwest Airlines’ safe
transportation of its passengers.120 Moreover, even if the essence of the
business test were somehow met, it would be neither impracticable nor
impossible to make individual determinations about which women could
meet the demands, rather than using age as a proxy.
Perhaps a recognition that a BFOQ defense was unwinnable is what
kept KMBC and other stations from raising it. But at the time the Craft
case was brought, the stringency of the BFOQ defense was not so firmly
established. So why was the defense not asserted? Most likely, it was
because the credibility of television as a news-gathering and reporting
organization undoubtedly was and is on the minds of news departments and
their stations.121 For a news department to insist that the essence of its
business is not delivering the news but instead is delivering the news in a
sexually appealing way would be a step too far for even the most
entertainment-minded news directors.
Stations and networks pride
themselves on the integrity of their news organizations; asserting that they
are all about appearance as opposed to substance would be at odds with the
credibility they seek with their viewers. So stations and networks are
unlikely to assert BFOQ defenses, and even were they to be asserted, courts
are unlikely to accept them. .
C. Customer Preference and Television News
Which brings us to the customer preference defense. Assuming that
viewers do judge women’s appearance more stringently than men’s and do
take that into account in choosing which channel to watch, are employers
forbidden from factoring those preferences into their employment
119 See Buchman, supra note 43Error! Bookmark not defined., at 205–06 (discussing
the BFOQ defense in the context of television news).
120 Buchman, supra note 43, at 206. See also Leslie S. Gielow, Sex Discrimination in
Newscasting, 84 MICH. L. REV. 443, 466 (1985).
121 I suspect television reporters and anchors, even today, still harbor a bit of an
inferiority complex as compared to their print brethren. Newspaper reporters have a
credibility in the hard journalism field that television reporters are often perceived as
lacking. Notice, for example, how often reporters from the New York Times and
Washington Post appear as guests on CNN and MSNBC.
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decisions?122 Could, or should, customer preference somehow form a
defense to claims such as these?
As mentioned above, customer preference has not been found
sufficient for satisfaction of a BFOQ. That an employer may make money
by catering to its customers’ discriminatory preferences is no defense to a
disparate treatment claim is a well-established tenet of disparate treatment
theory.123 Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified this approach
by amending Title VII to assert that business necessity is not a defense to a
disparate treatment claim.124
And yet.125 While employers may not defend against disparate
treatment claims by acknowledging they intentionally discriminated but did
so only at the behest of their customers, what happens when an employer
acts on the basis of customer feedback that is itself the product of bias?
More concretely, could a station fire a news anchor based on poor ratings,
even if those ratings are themselves influenced by customer bias?126 The
answer to this last question is far from certain.
What does seem well-established is that customer preference is no
defense to an employer’s own intentional discrimination.127 For example,
an employer’s refusal to hire a woman for a job because of a concern that
customers would not accept her in that role is still discrimination because
of sex. Had KMBC refused to hire a woman for an anchor role because she
was a woman, it would be liable for sex discrimination, even if it did so
And according to the consultant in the Craft case, they do. “[V]iewers—particularly
other women—criticize women more severely than men for their appearance on camera and
that women’s dress is more complex and demanding because ‘society has made it that
way.’” Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1214 (8th Cir. 1985).
123 See Waldman, supra note 107, at 93 (“A basic tenet of employment discrimination
law is that customer preferences generally cannot justify discriminatory treatment by
employers.”). See Buchman, supra note 43, at 203–04 (showing a station’s argument that it
would lose revenue if forced to keep older women anchors on the air is not a defense to a
disparate treatment claim).
124 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(2) (2018).
125 Professor Waldman’s article, supra note 107, described the various ways that
customer preferences, despite the received wisdom to the contrary, in fact are taken into
account by the courts. She points to privacy based BFOQs, gender specific appearance
requirements, business necessity defenses, and reasonable accommodations as collective
examples of situations where customer preferences are used to defend against discrimination
claims. Waldman, supra note 107, at 97–123.
126 In the Craft case, the district court concluded that KMBC had “reasonably relied on
the survey results as the basis for the personnel change.” 766 F.2d at 1210. The appellate
court affirmed that finding as not clearly erroneous. Id.
127 See Dallan F. Flake, When Should Employers Be Liable for Factoring Biased
Customer Feedback into Employment Decisions?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2169, 2196 (2018),
(discussing judicial rejection of the customer preference defense); Gielow, supra note 120,
at 443 (“Under Title VII . . ., customer preference is generally not a justification for sexually
discriminatory employment decisions.”).
122
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based on a concern that its viewers prefer male anchors.128
But what if a news station (or other employer) makes an employment
decision based on customer feedback? If that feedback is openly biased, as
it was in the Craft case, and if the employer is aware it is biased, holding
the employer liable for acting upon it is not too much of a reach.129 There
seems appreciably little difference between an employer who refuses to
hire a female because he believes his customer will react adversely to a
woman and an employer who knowingly fires the woman because his
customers do.130
An employer’s conscious reliance on openly
discriminatory feedback seems well within the reach of the statute.
But, as Professor Dallan Flake asserts, “employers’ use of biased
customer feedback to make employment decisions has gone largely
unchecked,”131 noting “the courts have not directly addressed employers’
use of discriminatory customer feedback.”132 And the problem is
particularly difficult when the feedback, while rooted in bias, implicit or
otherwise,133 is not openly so. As Professor Deborah Brake observes,
128

There were strong suggestions in the Craft litigation that Craft had been hired
because she was a woman. The station perceived a need to “soften” its male anchor with a
female presence, and other stations in the market had gone with male/female anchor teams.
Craft, 766 F.2d at 1208. Assuming Craft got the job because she was a woman, would that
stop her from claiming discrimination when she was later removed from the job? No. That
she has benefitted from discrimination in the past does not preclude her from claiming
discrimination in the present.
129
Flake, supra note 127, at 2196 (asserting that when feedback is intentionally biased
and employer knows and uses it anyway, it “seems clear that in such cases the employer
could—and should—be liable.”); Gielow, supra note 120, at 457 (stating that the Craft court
“failed to consider whether the survey itself was sex biased, or whether the viewers brought
sexual stereotypes to the viewings and thereby tainted the outcome of an otherwise sexneutral survey.”). See also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 419–22 (2011) (endorsing
the “cat’s paw” theory of liability for discrimination claims).
130 There may be a narrow exception in cases involving privacy or safety, where
customer preference arguments are essentially accepted as BFOQs. The Court in Johnson
Controls, however, did not reach the question of privacy-based BFOQs. Int’l Union v.
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 206, n.4 (1991).
131 Flake, supra note 127, at 2170–71.
See Buchman, supra note 43, at 210
(“Apparently, ratings and audience research indicate that television audiences prefer to have
their news delivered by attractive young anchorwomen, and thus their use by the television
news industry in personnel decisionmaking has had an adverse impact on older women
seeking to secure or retain anchor positions.”); Gielow, supra note 120, at 444 (“The public,
according to many media personnel, evaluates female newscasters by different criteria from
those used to judge their male counterparts. In response to perceived public expectations,
networks treat them differently as well.”).
132 Flake, supra note 127, at 2190. See also Gielow, supra note 120, at 447 (contending
that “viewer surveys almost always reflect sexual stereotypes that are impermissible under
title VII . . . and . . . such surveys should be presumptively inadmissible as evidence to rebut
a claim of sex discrimination.”).
133 There has long been a debate over whether disparate treatment theory reaches what is
often termed as “implicit” or “cognitive” bias. For a discussion of cognitive bias and its role
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courts seem to be “increasingly wedded to a conception of the disparate
treatment claim as predicated on the decision maker’s conscious reliance
on a discriminatory reason.”134 If the employer is unaware that the
customer feedback, or ratings in the case of television news, are the product
of bias, then holding the employer liable for intentional discrimination is,
quite frankly, unlikely. As Professor Flake observes, “Can it really be said
that an employer intentionally discriminates when it factors into an
employment decision facially neutral feedback that is tainted by hidden
bias that only a skilled social scientist could detect?”135
That women are frequently rated lower than their male counterparts is
no secret; female professors, female judges, even female orchestra
performers often come up short in ratings as compared to men.136
Nonetheless, when an employer relies on those rankings, particularly when
they are facially neutral, a finding of intentional discrimination will be hard
to come by.
Of course, this gives employers little incentive to look behind the face
of the ratings or customer feedback to see if they may be the product of
bias; indeed, it encourages employers to do the opposite.137 Even if it
suspects its viewers may be reacting adversely to an older woman vis-á-vis
an older man or a younger woman because she is an older woman, so long
as its decision is based on the ratings themselves, a liability finding is
unlikely. As Professor Flake observes, neither the disparate treatment nor

in disparate treatment theory, including citation to the numerous articles on the topic, see
CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 8–10 (9th ed. 2017).
134 Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination: From
Unjustified Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 GEO. L.J. 559, 572
(2017). See Flake, supra note 127(quoting Brake).
135 Flake, supra note 127, at 2195–96. Well, yes, it could, if one endorses a causal
approach to disparate treatment. If the employee loses her job because she is a woman, even
if the bias prompting it is implicit, then she has been treated differently because of her sex.
See generally Rebeca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?:
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decisionmaking?, 61 LA. L. REV. 495 (2001)
(advocating a causation-based approach to intentional discrimination). As noted above,
however, courts have generally insisted on a conscious decision to take sex or age into
account. Even the Price Waterhouse plurality described the motive inquiry in the following
terms:
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that, if
we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we
received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee
was a woman.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
136 Flake, supra note 127, at 2188. This often is ascribed to implicit or cognitive bias.
See SULLIVAN & ZIMMER, supra note 133.
137 Flake, supra note 127, at 2195–96.
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the disparate impact138 analytical framework “is fully equipped to handle
customer feedback discrimination claims and, in fact, have made such
claims virtually unwinnable.”139
VI. A WORD ABOUT DISPARATE IMPACT
Up to this point, we have not discussed the disparate impact theory of
discrimination. Both Title VII140 and the ADEA141 embrace disparate
impact claims. Unlike disparate treatment, which, as we have seen,
requires a finding of intentional discrimination, disparate impact does not.
Rather, when a facially neutral policy or criterion adversely impacts a
protected class, then liability may exist under either Title VII or the ADEA.
For example, if an employer requires its workers to pass a test in order
to be hired, that requirement is facially neutral. Moreover, the employer
may have adopted the requirement with no intent to discriminate but rather
in an effort to achieve a well-trained workforce. Nonetheless, if the
requirement screens out more black than white, or more female than male,
or more older than younger, employees, the policy would have a disparate
impact on black people, women or older workers.
In the context of the present discussion, could a station’s use of
ratings or customer feedback, a facially neutral practice, form the basis for
a disparate impact claim? Would today’s older female anchors have a
greater likelihood of success if they pursue relief under a disparate impact
theory?
It is doubtful.142 While identifying the particular practice or practices
causing the impact (ratings and/or viewer surveys) may not be difficult,143
impact must still be shown. This is usually understood to require a
statistical showing of the challenged practice’s impact on the protected
group. When employment decisions affect only one or a handful of people,
138

Disparate impact claims are discussed infra at notes 140–53 and accompanying text.
Flake, supra note 127, at 2173. Flake advocates a negligence-based approach that
would hold employers liable if they knew or should have known the feedback was biased
and that considers whether the employer acted reasonably in response by taking appropriate
preventive or corrective measures.
140 The Supreme Court recognized disparate impact theory under Title VII in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Congress codified disparate impact theory in
Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, amending Title VII to expressly authorize
disparate impact claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2018).
141 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
142 But see Bal, supra note 108, at 212 (contending that disparate impact theory “may
provide a more successful means by which anchorwomen can prove unlawful, appearancerelated discrimination than disparate treatment claims,” when stations rely on viewer
surveys and other forms of market research).
143 Disparate impact theory, under both Title VII and the ADEA, requires the plaintiff to
identify the particular practice or practices causing the impact.
139
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establishing impact on the protected group can be difficult, if not
impossible, when the number of people subject to the particular practices is
quite small.144 While an individual likely may bring an impact claim, it is
still a statistically-based, group-based claim.145 And building such a
statistical case becomes even more difficult when the allegation is that the
practice impacts not all women or all persons over forty but only women of
a certain age.146 Must impact be shown on women as a whole as opposed
to on a subset of women?147 Must impact be shown on all workers age
forty or above, as opposed to a subset of older workers?148 And, of course,
there is the complication of intersectionality when the disparate impact
structure varies between Title VII and the ADEA. Could a disparate
impact claim be brought under Title VII when the impact falls on a group
defined by sex plus age, rather than on sex or age alone?149
Moreover, once impact is shown, employers have a defense under
either Title VII or the ADEA. Under Title VII, if the employer can show
the challenged practice is job-related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity, the impact claim is defeated, unless the
144 Flake, supra note 127, at 2210 (“A final problem with the disparate impact
framework [in customer feedback cases] is that establishing a statistically significant
adverse impact almost always requires that a sufficiently large and diverse population be
affected by the challenged practice. Indeed, courts have routinely held that an adverse effect
on a single or a few employees does not create a prima facie case of disparate impact as a
matter of law.” (footnotes omitted)). See also Bal, supra note 108, at 230 (acknowledging
the difficulty of showing impact because of the small number of employment decisions
involved). But see Buchman, supra note 43, at 210 (contending that research shows ratings
have an adverse impact on older women anchors generally).
145 But see Michael J. Zimmer, Individual Disparate Impact Law: On the Plain Meaning
of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 473, 473 (1999) (arguing the plain
language of the statute would allow an impact claim upon a plaintiff’s showing that (1) the
employer took adverse action based on an employment practice; (2) an alternative practice
exists that would serve the employer’s needs without adversely impacting the plaintiff; and
(3) the employer refused to adopt the practice).
146 See Martha Chamallas, Exploring the Entire Spectrum of Disparate Treatment Under
Title VII: Rules Governing Primarily Female Jobs, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 50, n.263 (“In a
disparate impact challenge, however, marshalling convincing evidence that the standard has
an adverse impact on women as a group may be very difficult, especially when the
challenged standard is as difficult to measure as physical attractiveness. Essentially, the
plaintiff would attempt to show that more women than men would likely be excluded from
the qualified applicant pool, given the defendant’s measure of attractiveness.”).
147 See Thompson v. Miss. State Pers. Bd., 674 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Miss. 1987)
(rejecting impact claim for women over forty).
148 Marc Chase McAllister, Subgroup Analysis in Disparate Impact Age Discrimination
Cases: Striking the Appropriate Balance Through Age Cutoffs, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1073, 1090
(2019) (noting that “courts are split regarding whether subgroups of employees in the
ADEA’s 40-and-over protected class may claim disparate impact discrimination.”).
149 See Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, No. 17-cv-01294-RM-NYW,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104796 (D. Colo. June 22, 2018) (rejecting disparate impact claim
based on sex plus age).
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plaintiff can demonstrate there is a less discriminatory alternative.150 Under
the ADEA, the employer’s burden is even lighter. It need only show the
impact causing practice is a reasonable factor other than age.151 Basing an
employment decision on ratings or customer feedback, assuming such
feedback is facially neutral, would most likely satisfy the employer’s
burden under either statute.152 Rankings are the coin of the realm in the
television industry, and thus reliance on them would more likely than not
be viewed as a business necessity and/or a reasonable factor other than
age.153
VII. CONCLUSION
Decades after Christine Craft lost her job as a television news anchor,
a similar fate has befallen a number of other women, who, despite (or
perhaps because of) their years of experience on the air are being pushed
aside for younger, more attractive women. Meanwhile, their middle aged
and older male counterparts continue to deliver the news.
The plight of these high-profile women shows how inadequate our
anti-discrimination laws and proof frameworks are in protecting older
women against discrimination. It is not just beauty and youth that fade as
women age; their jobs do, too. If courts are unwilling to view older women
as a protected subgroup under a “sex plus” or “age plus” theory, then it will
be difficult for women of a certain age to prevail in their employment
discrimination suits.
These cases also show the hollowness of the accepted maxim that
employers cannot intentionally discriminate because it is good for business.
Whether it is courts’ unwillingness to acknowledge the unequal appearance
standards men and women are held to on the air, and/or their willingness to
permit employers to rely on viewer preferences when making employment
decisions about on air talent, courts are permitting employers to treat older
150

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
Smith v.City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
152 See Flake, supra note 127, at 2210 (asserting that customer satisfaction is likely be
viewed as a business necessity). See also Waldman, supra note 107, at 96 (acknowledging
that it is unclear whether a customer preference could satisfy either the business necessity
defense under Title VII or the Reasonable Factor Other Than Age defense under the ADEA.
But appearance-based preferences, she says, “intuitively strike courts as reasonable and
natural, both because they do not seem invidiously discriminatory and because they align
with ingrained social conventions and norms.”).
153 But see Buchman, supra note 43, at 212–14 (contending that ratings would not
constitute business necessity since they do not measure the anchor’s ability to report
“intelligently and articulately,” and thus would not be job-related for the position); Bal,
supra note 108, at 224–26 (contending that employers would need to prove the business
necessity of the viewer surveys, including professional validation under the Uniform
Guidelines of Employee Selection Procedures).
151
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women differently, and less favorably, than their younger female or older
male counterparts. Women anchors, it seems, do come with an expiration
date. And our federal anti-discrimination statutes, as they are being
interpreted and applied, are letting it happen.

